Re Protocol reUSD
Score Breakdown
| Category | Weight | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Audits & Historical | 20% | 2.50 |
| Centralization & Control | 30% | 4.00 |
| Funds Management | 30% | 4.00 |
| Liquidity Risk | 15% | 3.50 |
| Operational Risk | 5% | 2.50 |
| Final Score | 3.6 / 5.0 | |
Overview
Re Protocol is a decentralized onchain reinsurance marketplace that tokenizes real-world reinsurance treaties, enabling DeFi participants to earn insurance-backed yields. The protocol is designed as a blockchain-native version of Lloyd's of London, connecting onchain capital with regulated reinsurance programs.
reUSD is the protocol's principal-protected, yield-accruing deposit token (branded "Basis-Plus"). It is designed as the "stable core" of the Re Protocol, analogous to a tokenized money-market fund with blockchain composability.
Yield Mechanism: reUSD accrues yield daily via a dual-source yield floor. At each daily valuation point (UTC 00:00), the protocol selects the higher of:
- Risk-Free Rate Path: 7-day trailing average risk-free rate + 250 bps (aligned with short-term Treasuries)
- Ethena Basis Trade Path: Current annualized Ethena USDe hedged basis yield + 250 bps (captures excess basis when the futures curve is steep)
The chosen "Applicable APY" is converted to a daily rate, and reUSD's token price (not quantity) increases daily. Current APY is approximately 6-9+%. See Funds Management → Token Mechanism for how the price is written onchain.
Capital Deployment:
- Users deposit admitted assets (e.g., USDC) into the Insurance Capital Layer (ICL) smart contracts and receive reUSD
- A portion of the pool is converted into cash/T-Bills held in a §114 Reinsurance Trust Account, providing regulatory collateral to a Cayman-domiciled partner reinsurer (licensed by CIMA under Class B(iii))
- The offchain entity issues Surplus Notes to the ICL, contractually locking in principal protection and an interest rate matching the Applicable APY
- Offchain balances are attested daily by The Network Firm (with read-only account access). The protocol's docs and marketing reference Chainlink Proof-of-Reserve — onchain investigation shows no Chainlink PoR feed is consumed by Re's deployed contracts. The reUSD share price is written directly via
setSharePriceon the Share Price Calculator; Chainlink is used only for sUSDe pricing (Chainlink sUSDe/USD feed0xFF3BC18cCBd5999CE63E788A1c250a88626aD099).
Key metrics (Apr 17, 2026):
- reUSD Price: ~$1.072 (CoinGecko); verified onchain as
1.0724via Share Price CalculatorgetSharePrice() - reUSD Market Cap: ~$186.7M (all chains, CoinGecko)
- reUSD Total Supply: ~174.1M tokens (CoinGecko); ~172.6M on Ethereum (Etherscan)
- 24h Trading Volume: ~$7.3M (CoinGecko)
- TVL (DeFi Llama): ~$198.1M (DeFi Llama)
- Total Deposits (Transparency Dashboard): ~$196.8M
Links:
Risk Summary
Key Strengths
- Senior tranche position (structural): reUSD sits senior to reUSDe and Re Capital in the loss waterfall; losses must breach both subordinated layers before touching reUSD.
- Third-party offchain reserve verification: Re's docs state that The Network Firm verifies offchain bank balances daily and also verifies protocol custody wallet ownership/balances; the only public document verified in this report is the Oct 2025 AUP.
- Comprehensive smart-contract audit coverage: 4 public smart-contract audit reports across Hacken and Certora, including Certora formal verification and a Hacken audit of the Chainlink-Functions-based
NAVConsumerthat is deployed onchain as the standard price writer. The Network Firm AUP is due diligence/reserve verification, not a smart-contract audit. - Onchain NAV path with automation and deviation guard: Daily share price is written by a Chainlink-Functions + Chainlink-Automation consumer with a
maxDeviationBps = 1000(10%) onchain check. Caveat: a single EOA can bypass it — see Key Risks. - Timelock on upgrades:
TimelockController.getMinDelay() = 172800(48 hours) on all privileged governance actions routed through it.DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLEon reUSD and ICL sits with a 3-of-5 Safe multisig. - Emergency mechanisms: Pause functionality on the InstantRedemption, LayerZero adapter, and NAV Consumer; designated recovery wallets; Chainalysis runtime monitoring.
Key Risks
- Single EOA can bypass the NAV Oracle: the standard price path is the audited Chainlink-Functions
NAVConsumer(10% deviation cap). However, the same EOA holds bothPRICE_SETTER_ROLEonSharePriceCalculatorand all admin / emergency / keeper roles onNAVConsumer. It can (a) write directly toSharePriceCalculator, skipping the Functions path, (b) callsetDeviationCheckEnabled(false)to disable the guard, or (c)forceNAVUpdateonce per 4 hours. Compromise of this key ≈ unchecked power over the reUSD share price. - Significant offchain capital deployment: Majority of assets are deployed offchain into §114 Trust and reinsurance programs. This introduces counterparty risk with the trust bank, partner reinsurer, and custodians that cannot be verified fully onchain.
- Instant redemption vault holds no USDC: The Daily Instant Redemption Vault holds
0USDC +6.188MsUSDe. The Redemption Reserves Custodian (EOA) holds0USDC +53.263MsUSDe.dayPayoutTokenis sUSDe — USDC-denominated instant exits are unavailable under the current config. - Onchain reserves heavily concentrated in sUSDe: Onchain reserves total ~$99.93M (~54.0% of Ethereum NAV — the protocol-stated ≥50% target is met with ~4 pp of headroom). But ~88% of the reserve is sUSDe and only ~9.3% (~$9.34M) is USDC. Ethena (sUSDe issuer) is a material counterparty: an Ethena incident, sUSDe unstaking bottleneck, or USDe depeg would directly impair the "50%+ onchain backing" narrative even before reaching offchain exposures. The BUIDL / T-bill wrappers mentioned in Re's materials are not held onchain.
- Three MINTER_ROLE holders on reUSD: Beyond the ICL,
InstantRedemptionandShareTokenMinterBurneralso hold MINTER_ROLE. The ICL path enforces backing viasafeTransferFrom.InstantRedemptionuses the role for burns during redemption.ShareTokenMinterBurneris a LayerZero OFT wrapper — its mint path has no backing check by design (supply is conserved cross-chain), but the OFT adapter0x2BB4046022B9161f3F84Ad8E35cac1d5946e0e85and the wrapper are both owned by the same EOA0x6C15B25E9750Dccb698C1a4023f34015bFe57649(not a multisig). Compromise of that key would let an attacker repoint the adapter and mint up to2,500,000 reUSD / 24h / peer(onchain rate limit) on Ethereum without backing. - DEX liquidity thin: only ~$14.96M of onchain-verified Re reUSD liquidity on DEXes (~8.0% of ~$186.7M market cap). (Previously-cited "~$26.2M" figure included Resupply reUSD pools, a different token.)
- KYC gating: All deposits and redemptions require KYC. This limits the universe of users who can exit and creates regulatory/jurisdictional risk.
- Quarterly redemption queue: Once instant buffer is exhausted, redemptions are windowed and pro-rata. Capital release from reinsurance programs is reevaluated quarterly per Re's public materials.
- Reinsurance tail risk: Underlying assets are exposed to insurance claim risk. reUSD is only impaired if the portfolio combined ratio exceeds 135%, after both Re Capital (~$73M) and all reUSDe reserves are depleted. reUSDe covers losses in the 115-135% combined ratio range. Re's historical combined ratio is ~92% and the portfolio avoids catastrophe lines, but tail risk from extreme loss events remains.
- No bug bounty program found: No Immunefi or comparable bug bounty program identified.
Critical Risks
- Custody / asset-movement surface — 92% of onchain reserves at plain EOAs:
$92.33Mof$99.93Mof onchain reserves sits at three plain EOAs listed in the AUP-Report-2025:0x295F67…689EICL Custodial Wallet ($24.39M);0x9eA38e…ADF8Redemption Reserves Custodian ($65.38M);0xd437…31e9auxiliary ($2.56M). None has code; all look identical to single-key wallets from the chain's perspective. No onchain delay, destination whitelist, or role check applies to their outbound transfers — one ECDSA signature moves the funds. The claimed Fireblocks MPC custody (N-of-M offchain quorum, destination policies) is unverifiable by anyone outside Re; TNF's AUP procedure was "observe Re Management access the Fireblocks MPC wallet," which does not cryptographically attest the N-of-M quorum. The 48h Timelock does NOT gate these flows. See Funds Management → Collateralization for the full custody table. - Offchain dependency concentration: The protocol's value proposition depends on offchain entities (Cayman reinsurer, §114 Trust, The Network Firm, Fireblocks) operating honestly and solvent. Onchain verification cannot fully cover offchain risks.
- Oracle/setter manipulation: the standard share-price path is the audited Chainlink-Functions
NAVConsumer(10% deviation cap), but a compromised admin EOA can bypass it (write directly toSharePriceCalculator, disable the deviation check, or callforceNAVUpdateevery 4h) and write arbitrary prices. There is no separate Chainlink PoR aggregator attesting reserves independently (see the Chainlink usage appendix) — reserve assurance reduces to The Network Firm's offchain AUP plus the onchain balances we audit directly. - Liquidity mismatch: reUSD represents liquid onchain tokens partially backed by offchain reinsurance capital. Capital release is reevaluated quarterly, and programs are short-duration and cat-light (per performance memo). The instant redemption vault holds no USDC (sUSDe only —
6.188Min vault,53.263Min Redemption Reserves Custodian). In a bank-run scenario, sUSDe redemption liquidity plus only ~$14.96M in DEX liquidity would need to absorb exits for ~$186.7M in outstanding tokens; windowed queue handles the remainder.
Full Report
Contract Addresses
Ethereum Network
Protocol Controls (Ethereum)
MPC team descriptions below come from Re's public protocol materials and cannot be independently verified onchain (MPC signer sets are offchain). What IS onchain-verifiable: (a) the Governance Safe is a 3-of-5 Safe multisig (not MPC) at 0x8EEc10616802Ef639ca55C98Ac856553FadeFbAd holding DEFAULT_ADMIN on reUSD/ICL and PROPOSER/CANCELLER on the Timelock; (b) the Timelock min delay is 172800 seconds = 48 hours; (c) an OpenZeppelin v5 AccessManager contract at 0x3f0DA1C363e34802C6f12F9C27276dC0e6696FD8 is the authority() for the Instant Redemption contract and is administered by the Access Admin EOA below.
| Role | Controller Address | Control Mechanism (per docs) | Onchain Authority | Permissions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oracle Admin | 0x49BC5A880f77247A348764DdB95951cd9212A0ee |
MPC 3-of-5 (docs), no timelock | EOA; role on Share Price Calculator not verified — current PRICE_SETTER_ROLE holders onchain: 0x6c15b25e...bfe57649 and 0x84d4eaeb10f9e57b67622f667c6c13e22fa4b2b6 |
Configure price feeds (per docs) |
| Redemptions Admin | 0xEE16bE0374f2eFb34218affC1a8EbEe9310c47f8 |
MPC 3-of-5 (docs), 48 hours | EOA | Set redemption limits, top-up redemption vault (per docs) |
| Access Admin | 0x80a62B72dF1136aCBc57141FB67Aa46812fECAFc |
MPC 5-of-8 (docs), 48 hours | EOA; observed calling grantRole / labelRole on AccessManager 0x3f0DA1C363e34802C6f12F9C27276dC0e6696FD8 |
Admin of OZ AccessManager (roles for Instant Redemption, etc.) |
| Custodian Manager | 0x9b6d7f2de2E4569297C7e88531E47679cEbE6eC9 |
MPC 3-of-5 (docs), 48 hours | EOA; holds CUSTODIAN_MANAGER_ROLE (0x0792b378…) on ICL — verified |
Add/remove collateral custodians |
| Governance (Upgrades / DEFAULT_ADMIN) | 0x8EEc10616802Ef639ca55C98Ac856553FadeFbAd |
Safe 3-of-5 (onchain-verified; not MPC) | Holds DEFAULT_ADMIN + UPGRADER on reUSD and ICL, PROPOSER + CANCELLER on Timelock | Contract upgrades, role administration (routed through Timelock for timelocked actions) |
| Timelock executor | 0x4BFea59b948a1a0FAC3C8C40BfD86E0e740738F3 |
EOA (onchain-verified) | Holds EXECUTOR_ROLE on the Timelock | Execute queued timelock transactions after 48h delay |
Cross-Chain Deployments
| Chain | reUSD Address |
|---|---|
| Avalanche | 0x180aF87b47Bf272B2df59dccf2D76a6eaFa625Bf |
| Arbitrum | 0x76cE01F0Ef25AA66cC5F1E546a005e4A63B25609 |
| Base | 0x7D214438D0F27AfCcC23B3d1e1a53906aCE5CFEa |
| Katana | 0xe08853433fDBC504240455e295B644E0F44c3B29 |
| BNB Chain | 0xbA9425EC55ee0E72216D18e0ad8BBbA2553bFb60 |
| Ink | 0x5BCf6B008bf80b9296238546BaCE1797657B05d6 |
Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures
Re Protocol has 4 public smart-contract audit reports from Hacken and Certora, plus a 2025 Agreed-Upon Procedures (AUP) report from The Network Firm for offchain reserve/custody verification.
Audit / Due Diligence History
| # | Date | Scope | Firm | Key Findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Sep 2024 | Smart Contract Audit (DeFi) | Hacken | 29 findings (0 Critical, 0 High, 4 Medium, 7 Low, 18 Observations), all resolved. Centralized minting, unaudited libraries, gas risk, 42.11% branch coverage | Hacken |
| 2 | Dec 2024 | Smart Contract Audit | Hacken | Follow-up audit, issues remediated | Hacken |
| 3 | Apr 2025 | NAV Oracle Audit | Hacken | Scope: the Chainlink-Functions-based NAVConsumer + related code at github.com/resilience-foundation/nav-oracle (commits ee7e98… / e3dd86ef…). 8 findings, all resolved. The audited contract IS deployed and active onchain at 0x84d4eaeb10f9e57b67622f667c6c13e22fa4b2b6, holds PRICE_SETTER_ROLE on the SharePriceCalculator, and runs daily at 23:45 UTC. |
Hacken |
| 4 | Sep 2025 | Re Core (comprehensive) | Certora | 13 issues identified, all addressed and fixed. Formal verification and manual review. | Certora |
| 5 | Oct 2025 | Agreed-Upon Procedures (reserve/custody verification; not a smart-contract audit) | The Network Firm | Independent verification of offchain operational controls and reserve attestation | AUP Report |
Hacken Aug 2024 Findings (Detail)
- Centralization: USDRWA and ReToken contracts concentrate minting/burning in a single address
- Unaudited Dependencies: Protocol uses libraries/contracts without security audits
- Gas Risk: Iteration over large dynamic arrays risks denial of service from out-of-gas errors
- Missing Governance Audit: Governance code was not covered in the audit scope
- Low Test Coverage: 42.11% branch coverage -- deployment and basic interactions tested, multi-user interactions not thoroughly tested
Bug Bounty
- No Immunefi bug bounty program found for Re Protocol
- No Safe Harbor adoption found via SEAL Safe Harbor Registry
Known Issues
- Centralized oracle price updates for reUSD (daily, admin-controlled)
- Centralized minting/burning via single controller addresses
- Governance code not yet audited
Historical Track Record
- Production History: Re Protocol launched in late 2022. reUSD token inception June 12, 2025 (per RWA.xyz). Curve pool created ~9 months ago per GeckoTerminal.
- TVL: ~$198.1M (DeFi Llama, Apr 17, 2026). ~$186.7M market cap across all chains (CoinGecko). ~174.1M reUSD total supply (CoinGecko); ~172.6M on Ethereum (onchain
totalSupply()). - Written Premiums: $168.8M in 2025. >$134M in reinsurance capacity unlocked.
- Exchange Rate History: reUSD has appreciated from ~$1.00 to ~$1.067, representing ~6.7% cumulative yield since inception (June 2025).
- Incidents: No reported security incidents, exploits, or hacks found for Re Protocol's reUSD on Rekt News or DeFi Llama hacks database. Note: Resupply Protocol (a different project with a different reUSD token at a different address) suffered a $9.6M exploit in June 2025 -- this is unrelated to Re Protocol/re.xyz.
- Peg/Price Stability: reUSD is not a stablecoin in the traditional sense. Its price is designed to monotonically increase (accruing yield), so "depegging" is not applicable in the same way. The token price should only ever go up.
Funds Management
Token Mechanism
reUSD is an ERC-20 deposit token that uses a price-appreciation model (not rebasing):
- Users deposit admitted assets (USDC) into the ICL smart contract and receive reUSD; the token price increases daily based on the Applicable APY.
- Onchain price path (verified Apr 17, 2026): the share price is stored in
SharePriceCalculator0xd1D104a7515989ac82F1AFDa15a23650411b05B8and written viasetSharePrice(uint256). The standard writer isNAVConsumer0x84d4eaeb10f9e57b67622f667c6c13e22fa4b2b6— a Chainlink Functions + Chainlink Automation consumer (DONfun-ethereum-mainnet-1, subscription85, daily at 23:45 UTC).NAVConsumerenforces a 10% onchain deviation cap (maxDeviationBps = 1000) and was audited by Hacken in April 2025 (github.com/resilience-foundation/nav-oracle, 8 findings, all resolved). ThePriceRouter0xFe76cF5eD606593fB7764f33627B8D7E0f9Fab66reads the calculator viaSharePriceOracle0x0764BFa862164D28799F31e7e1e7206F5177B6bB; the same router reads sUSDe viaSimpleOracle0xb6aD3633cB3FAfed3D375d8c64240f122E19fB4Dwrapping Chainlink'ssUSDe/USDaggregator0xFF3BC18cCBd5999CE63E788A1c250a88626aD099. TheSharePriceCalculatoritself only enforcesnewPrice != 0— the deviation cap lives in theNAVConsumer, not the calculator. - Residual concern: both
PRICE_SETTER_ROLEonSharePriceCalculatorand all admin/updater roles onNAVConsumer(includingEMERGENCY_UPDATER_ROLEwhich can callforceNAVUpdate, and the ability to flipsetDeviationCheckEnabled(false)to disable the guardrail) sit with the same EOA0x6C15B25E9750Dccb698C1a4023f34015bFe57649. That EOA can bypassNAVConsumerentirely and write any positive price directly to the calculator. - The Network Firm performs offchain attestations of the §114 Trust balances (cadence verified only via the single October 2025 AUP report). No Chainlink Proof-of-Reserve aggregator for reserves is consumed onchain — the onchain NAV Oracle publishes the share price, not reserves. See the Chainlink usage appendix at the end of this report.
- NAV formula:
(Spread/365) + max[sUSDe(T)/sUSDe(T-7d) - 1 ; TBILL(T)/TBILL(T-7d) - 1] × (undeployed capital / total capital) + SOFR × (deployed capital / total capital). Spread = 250 bps.
Capital Deployment
- Onchain: a portion of deposits is kept in onchain backing, verified at ~54% of Ethereum NAV on Apr 17, 2026 (see Collateralization). Held as USDC, USDT, USDe and sUSDe in the ICL Custodial Wallet and redemption reserves.
- Offchain (§114 Trust): Remainder deployed offchain into U.S.-domiciled §114 Reinsurance Trust Accounts, providing admitted collateral for the partner reinsurer's insurance programs
- Surplus Notes: The offchain entity issues legally binding surplus notes back to the ICL, contractually guaranteeing principal protection and the Applicable APY interest rate
- Yield Sources: Delta-neutral ETH strategy (Ethena basis trade) or T-Bills, plus protocol spread from reinsurance premiums
Reinsurance Portfolio (summary)
Re reinsures a ~$174M diversified portfolio of U.S. insurance programs across 26+ active reinsurance contracts. Re classifies the book as "low-volatility" and claims a ~92% combined ratio over 2022-2024 with no capital impairment. Stress testing asserted by Re gives reUSD a 0.03% loss likelihood at a 135% combined ratio (reUSDe 0.9%, Re Capital 3.9%). All portfolio composition, combined-ratio, ROE, pipeline, and stress-testing figures are sourced from Re's own LP memo and intro deck — none are independently verified.
Capital Structure: reUSDe (Junior Tranche)
reUSDe is the protocol's junior/first-loss tranche (docs). It absorbs underwriting losses before they reach reUSD in exchange for a share of underwriting profits (historically 16-25% net annual returns per docs).
Loss waterfall (losses absorbed in order):
- Re Capital (~$73M) — first-loss buffer, starts taking losses once portfolio combined ratio reaches 105%.
- reUSDe (junior) — starts taking losses once combined ratio reaches 115% (i.e. after Re Capital is exhausted). Absorbs losses up to the 115-135% combined ratio range.
- reUSD (senior) — only impaired if combined ratio exceeds 135%, meaning both Re Capital and all reUSDe reserves are depleted.
Re's marketing attaches modeled impairment likelihoods to each threshold (Re Capital ~3.9% at 105% CR; reUSDe ~0.9% at 115%; reUSD ~0.03% at 135%). These numbers come from a single chart on page 1 of the Nov 2025 LP Memo ("Re Capital Structure and Risk-Remote Design") and represent the modeled probability of the portfolio combined ratio reaching each threshold. The model is undisclosed: no distributional assumptions, correlation structure, simulation count, calibration window, confidence intervals, or actuarial sign-off are published. The tail figures also assume the subordinated buffer is fully intact at time of stress. Treat as Re-asserted, not independently attested.
reUSDe mechanics:
- Price based on quarterly-refreshed target NAV derived from actuarial reports; compounds daily but surplus realization occurs quarterly
- Idle capital earns sUSDe basis-trade yield until called for underwriting
- Redemptions are quarterly (72h window at fiscal quarter start), pro-rata if requests exceed capacity; unfilled rolls to next quarter
- Re's public materials describe a restoration order in which later reinsurance profits first recapitalize reUSD/reUSDe before the Re Capital buffer (not verifiable onchain).
- Issued by Resilience (BVI) Ltd.; Resilience Foundation is the Agent of both reUSD and reUSDe token holders
- reUSD is stated to be protected by subordinated assets (Re Capital + reUSDe combined); only Re Capital ~$73M is directly referenced in the LP Memo. The total subordinated buffer amount is a protocol claim, not independently verified.
Accessibility
- Deposits: KYC/AML required (via SumSub and Chainalysis). Users must pass KYC checks because a portion of protocol capital is deployed with a Cayman-regulated reinsurance company (CIMA-regulated).
- KYC on redemption — enforced onchain (verified Apr 17, 2026): every redemption entrypoint reverts with
KYCRequiredifkyc.isKYCApproved(msg.sender) == false. Checked functions in theInstantRedemptionInteractioncontract0x8aEb9453EF22Cb38abC7a3Af9c208F65C1BfE31e:redeemInstant,submitWindowRequest,adjustWindowRequest,claimWindowPayout. The same check is repeated insideInstantRedemption._processRedemptionon the user argument. A KYC revocation therefore blocks not only new deposits but also the holder's ability to redeem onchain through the protocol. Selling on a DEX remains possible because DEX routers do not gate transfers on KYC. - reUSD — Instant Redemption: available from the onchain instant liquidity buffer via
redeemInstant(uint256 shares, uint256 minPayout)on the Interaction contract (which delegates to theInstantRedemptionimplementation at0xa31DeeBB3680A3007120e74bcBdf4dF36F042a40). Atomic, same-block settlement. Onchain-verified parameters on Apr 17, 2026:minRedemption = 0.01 reUSD(1e16),maxRedemption = 1,000,000 reUSD(1e24),dailyLimitBps = 2000(20% of capacity),userLimitBps = 1000(10% per wallet),feeBps = 6(0.06%),dayPayoutToken = sUSDe. At the fastest drain rate, ~5 days to exhaust all liquid onchain reserves (20% per day). The "250 reUSD minimum" cited elsewhere is not in the public docs and contradicts the onchain parameter; treat0.01 reUSDas the contract-level floor. - reUSD — Windowed Redemption: once the instant buffer is exhausted, the protocol opens a redemption window (minimum 24 hours). Requests fulfilled pro-rata based on available capital. Proceeds must be claimed within two months.
- reUSDe — redemption works differently (per docs): no instant redemption path exists. reUSDe redemptions are quarterly-only. Request window = first 72 hours of each fiscal quarter; an "actuarial gate" at quarter-end (≤10 business days) determines Available Surplus; payouts are pro-rata against that surplus; unfilled balances auto-roll into the next quarter while retaining queue seniority. Re explicitly notes "No secondary market maker pool is promised" for reUSDe. The senior-tranche instant buffer/vault described above applies to reUSD only, not reUSDe.
- DEX Trading (Re reUSD only): Fluid reUSD/USDT DEX pool (~$11.62M — note: USDT, not USDC); Curve reUSD/sUSDe (~$1.42M) and reUSD/USDC (~$450K); Avalanche Blackhole reUSD/USDC pools (~$1.47M combined). Total DEX liquidity ~$14.96M on Apr 17, 2026 (DeFi Llama yields API, filtered by underlying token
0x5086…0c72/0x180aF87b…625Bf). Larger pools labelled "reUSD/scrvUSD", "reUSD/sfrxUSD", "reUSD/fxUSD", "reUSD/sDOLA" on Curve/Convex/Stake-DAO/Beefy are Resupply Protocol's reUSD (0x57aB1E00…) and are NOT Re reUSD exits. - Not available to U.S. persons
- Fees: Redemption fee of
6 bps(0.06%) — onchain-verified viaInstantRedemption.feeBps() = 6at0xa31DeeBB3680A3007120e74bcBdf4dF36F042a40(docs). No documented deposit fees, management fees, or performance fees. RWA.xyz reports 0.18% subscription and 0.18% redemption fees — discrepancy with docs may reflect different fee tiers or methodology. Onchain data shows ~$1,535 total deposit fees collected historically, suggesting a small deposit fee mechanism exists in the contracts (also flagged in Hacken audit finding F-2024-5214 "Unclaimed Deposit Fees Unaccounted For").
Collateralization
- Onchain reserve target: Re's public materials describe a target of ≥50% of deposits kept in onchain backing (USDC, sUSDe, and — per protocol claim — potentially T-bill wrappers such as BUIDL).
- Onchain reserves — verified Apr 17, 2026 against AUP address list: The Network Firm's Oct-2025 AUP report lists 15 Fireblocks-MPC-controlled addresses as in-scope for Re's supporting assets (
AUP-Report-2025.pdf, Procedure 3 table). All 15 were checked for USDC / USDT / USDe / sUSDe / BUIDL balances today. 11 are empty; 4 hold all the reserves:
| # | AUP-listed address | Chain type | Current USD value | Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0x295F67Fdb21255A3Db82964445628a706FBe689E ICL Custodial Wallet |
EOA | $24.39M (USDC $9.34M + USDT $1.99M + USDe $0.10M + sUSDe $12.96M) | 24.4% |
| 2 | 0x9eA38e09F41A9DE53972a68268BA0Dcc6d2fAdf8 Redemption Reserves Custodian |
EOA | $65.38M (sUSDe) | 65.4% |
| 3 | 0xd4374008c88321Eb2e59ABD311156C44B25831e9 |
EOA | $2.56M (USDe $0.99M + sUSDe $1.57M) | 2.6% |
| 4 | 0x5C454f5526e41fBE917b63475CD8CA7E4631B147 Daily Instant Redemption Vault |
Contract (RedemptionVault) |
$7.60M (sUSDe) | 7.6% |
| 5 | 0x4691C475bE804Fa85f91c2D6D0aDf03114de3093 ICL |
Contract (proxy) | $0 | — |
| 6 | 0xE1886BE2bA8B2496c2044a77516F63a734193082 |
Contract | $258 (dust) | — |
| 7-15 | 0x19af…5896, 0x4F1f…DaE4, 0x802e…0291, 0x9AB6…1FE3, 0xb22a…fbe1, 0xD75E…eDE9, 0xe132…9d23, 0xfB60…4BB0, 0xfd40…B852 | 9 × EOA | $0 | — |
| Total | ~$99.93M | 100% |
(sUSDe valued at the onchain sUSDe/USDe exchange rate of 1.22757 via convertToAssets, assuming USDe ≈ $1.)
Coverage ratio: $99.93M / $185.10M Ethereum NAV = ~54.0% (~53.5% vs $186.72M total cross-chain NAV). The protocol-stated ≥50% target is met with ~4 percentage points of headroom.
Address 3 (0xd4374008…B25831e9) is listed in the AUP but was not previously enumerated in this report. It currently holds $2.56M of USDe and sUSDe. Its purpose is undocumented publicly; from its onchain behaviour it appears to be an auxiliary custody / rebalancing EOA in the Fireblocks set.
Concentration concerns (onchain-verified):
- ~90.1% of onchain reserves are in sUSDe, not USDC. This inherits Ethena counterparty / smart-contract risk and a 7-day cooldown to unstake sUSDe → USDe. Only ~$9.34M of the reserves (≈9.8%) is immediately-redeemable USDC.
- No BUIDL or T-bill-wrapper balances were found at any of the ICL / vault / custodian addresses (Apr 17, 2026), even though Re's materials mention such assets as potential reserves. Apart from USDC / USDT / USDe / sUSDe, the only non-dust holding is ~1.35M
reUSDsUSDeCurve LP tokens at the ICL Custodial Wallet (protocol-owned liquidity for the reUSD/sUSDe pool; excluded from the reserve total above). All other token balances at these addresses are airdrop spam or dust (<$500). - The ICL contract
0x4691…3093itself holds $0 in reserves — assets sit at the Custodial Wallet (an EOA) and at the Redemption Reserves Custodian (also an EOA).
Custody / asset-movement surface — 92% of reserves sit at plain EOAs (critical):
Of the $99.93M onchain reserve, $92.33M (~92.4%) sits at three plain EOAs: the ICL Custodial Wallet (~$24.4M), the Redemption Reserves Custodian (~$65.4M), and the auxiliary address
0xd4374008…B25831e9(~$2.6M). Only $7.60M (the Daily Instant Redemption Vault) sits behind contract-enforced role gating. From the chain's perspective, each EOA is indistinguishable from an ordinary single-key wallet. One ECDSA signature, onetransfer(...)call, and those funds move anywhere — no onchain delay, no destination whitelist, no role check.Re's documentation and the October 2025 AUP describe these as "Fireblocks MPC (Multi-Party Computation) wallets" in which "the associated private key is split into encrypted 'shares'" (AUP Report 2025, footnote 2). Important caveats about what the AUP actually proves:
- The AUP procedure for the Fireblocks assets was "observe Re Management access the Fireblocks blockchain-based MPC wallet" and then "query the blockchain-based addresses observed for Supporting Assets". This is watching someone log in; it is not cryptographic verification that N-of-M signers are required for any given transaction. TNF relied on Re's assertion of the MPC structure.
- The AUP explicitly disclaims operating-effectiveness testing of internal controls: "We did not perform procedures regarding the operating effectiveness of the Re's internal controls."
- The AUP was also scoped to exclude 1:1 backing, TVL, and token valuations: "We did not perform procedures over specific aspects of the Re Protocol, including but not limited to … 1:1 backing of reserves to the tokens or the total value locked (TVL) of the Re Protocol."
Onchain, the EOAs have no code — no Safe multisig, no timelock wrapper, no onchain-whitelisted destination set, no per-asset spending caps. Whatever Fireblocks policies exist (transaction whitelists, per-asset limits, approval workflows) and whatever the real MPC quorum is are entirely offchain and unverifiable by anyone outside Re. The 48-hour Timelock does NOT protect these reserves — it only gates governance actions routed through
TimelockController(upgrades, role changes).What's needed to drain $92.3M onchain:
- If the claimed N-of-M MPC is real and Fireblocks policies are tight → compromise the policy + compromise or collude signer quorum → 1 signed tx.
- If Fireblocks policies are permissive → signer-quorum compromise / collusion alone → 1 signed tx.
- If an insider with quorum access is malicious → 1 signed tx.
This is the single largest unmitigated custody risk in the system. The AUP provides evidence that the specific address list is in Re's MPC setup, not that unauthorized movement would be prevented by multi-party signing.
Onchain buffer: Instant redemption vault and Redemption Reserves Custodian hold ~$72.98M of sUSDe plus $0 USDC for immediate redemptions (USDC instant exits unavailable under current config; see Liquidity).
Offchain trust: §114 Reinsurance Trust holds cash and T-Bills in NAIC-compliant banks; Re's public materials name these as "an independent bank / custodian" without disclosing specific counterparty names. The only independently-verified attestation of these balances is the Oct 31, 2025 Agreed-Upon Procedures report by The Network Firm (
AUP-Report-2025.pdf); no ongoing cadence is publicly established. Re's docs describe the publication as "published via Chainlink" — onchain, no Chainlink PoR aggregator is consumed (see the Chainlink usage appendix).Surplus Note protection: Surplus notes rank junior to policyholders but contractually protect depositor principal
Re Capital buffer: ~$73M subordinated first-loss layer ahead of reUSDe and reUSD
reUSDe as backstop: reUSDe (the risk-bearing token) absorbs first-loss risk across the reinsurance portfolio, providing a backstop to prevent losses reaching reUSD holders. Stress testing shows reUSD loss likelihood = 0.03% at 135% combined ratio
Provability
- reUSD price: Updated daily by a Chainlink-Functions-driven
NAVConsumer0x84d4eaeb10f9e57b67622f667c6c13e22fa4b2b6callingSharePriceCalculator.setSharePrice. The NAV computation itself is not programmatically onchain — Chainlink Functions runs JS offchain (DONfun-ethereum-mainnet-1, subscription85) and returns a single NAV value. Onchain safeguards: Chainlink Automation triggers daily at 23:45 UTC;NAVConsumer.maxDeviationBps = 1000(10%) enforces a deviation guard; Hacken audited the NAV Oracle in Apr 2025. Residual concern: admin/updater roles onNAVConsumerandPRICE_SETTER_ROLEonSharePriceCalculatorare both held by a single EOA that can bypass the guard. - Onchain reserves: Visible onchain via the ICL contract and Redemption Reserves Custodian
- Offchain reserves: Attested daily by The Network Firm (third-party accountant with read-only access). Re's docs claim this attestation is "published via Chainlink" / "Proof-of-reserves, publicly auditable". This claim could not be substantiated (Apr 17, 2026): no Chainlink PoR feed for reUSD exists in Chainlink's public reference directory (
reference-data-directory.vercel.app/feeds-mainnet.json, 23 mainnet PoR feeds — none for Re / reUSD / Resilience; also absent on Avalanche and BSC directories). No Chainlink PoR aggregator is consumed by any verified Re contract. The actual onchain Chainlink dependency is thesUSDe/USDprice aggregator (0xFF3BC18cCBd5999CE63E788A1c250a88626aD099) used for collateral pricing, not reserves. See "Chainlink PoR claim — not substantiated" in the appendix. - Insurance performance: Reinsurance returns are inherently offchain and depend on claim experience over multi-year treaty periods
- Minting requires backing (ICL path): All ICL deposit paths (
deposit,depositFromCustodian,processPrestakedDeposit) enforcesafeTransferFrom— backing tokens must be transferred to the ICL before reUSD is minted (verified in source at implementation0x06d4acc104b974cd99bf22e4572f48a051e59670). However, the reUSD token contract has an unrestrictedmint(address, uint256)gated only byMINTER_ROLE. - MINTER_ROLE holders (verified via RoleGranted logs on Apr 17, 2026): THREE contracts hold the role, not one:
InsuranceCapitalLayer0x4691C475bE804Fa85f91c2D6D0aDf03114de3093— backed mint path.InstantRedemption0xa31DeeBB3680A3007120e74bcBdf4dF36F042a40— burns reUSD on redemption; uses MINTER_ROLE becausemintandburntypically share the role in this codebase.ShareTokenMinterBurner0x0dFb42aa18CEeD719617cd554304F6cA412A6b18— LayerZero OFT wrapper. Only the registeredadaptercan callmint/burn. TheadapterisReMintBurnAdapter0x2BB4046022B9161f3F84Ad8E35cac1d5946e0e85, a LayerZero OFT with onchain rate limits of2,500,000 reUSD / 24h(inbound and outbound) per peer chain. There is no token-level backing check on this mint path by design — cross-chain OFTs conserve supply by burning on the source chain. Risk: bothShareTokenMinterBurner.ownerandReMintBurnAdapter.ownerare the same EOA0x6C15B25E9750Dccb698C1a4023f34015bFe57649(~0.099 ETH balance). Compromise of this key would let an attacker redirect the adapter and mint up to the 2.5M/day rate limit on Ethereum per connected peer chain.
- If
MINTER_ROLEwere granted to another address via Governance Safe, that address could mint without a backing check at the token layer.
Liquidity Risk
Primary Exit Mechanisms
- Instant Redemption: From the onchain buffer. Atomic, same-block. Available until buffer is exhausted (< 1% of supply triggers window-only mode)
- Quarterly Redemption: Processed pro-rata with available capital not reserved for reinsurance plus actuarially released funds
- DEX Swap: Sell reUSD on Curve reUSD/USDC pool
DeFi Integrations
Onchain-verified integrations that consume Re Protocol's reUSD (0x5086…0c72):
| Protocol | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Fluid DEX | DEX | reUSD/USDT pool (~$11.62M TVL, ~$1.67M daily volume). Largest trading venue. |
| Fluid Lending | Lending | Three lending markets supply reUSD: ~$23.58M (vs USDT), ~$23.34M (vs USDC), ~$15.35M (vs fxUSD). Total reUSD supplied ~$62.3M. |
| Curve | DEX | reUSD/sUSDe (~$1.42M), reUSD/USDC (~$450K). (reUSD/scrvUSD, reUSD/sfrxUSD, reUSD/fxUSD, reUSD/sDOLA pools are Resupply reUSD, not Re's.) |
| Morpho | Lending | Re reUSD vaults (~$4.74M + ~$2.29M ≈ $7.0M). PT-REUSD-25JUN2026 Pendle-PT markets also reference Re reUSD indirectly. |
| Pendle | Yield | reUSD yield-tokenization market (~$8.42M TVL). |
| Beefy | Vault | reUSD auto-compounding vault (~$786K). |
| Stake-DAO | Vault | reUSD vault (~$428K). |
| Blackhole (Avalanche) | DEX | reUSD/USDC pools on Blackhole CLMM + AMM (~$962K + ~$510K ≈ $1.47M). |
Combined ~$69.3M of Re reUSD is supplied into Fluid + Morpho lending markets onchain.
Liquidity Summary
- Total DEX Liquidity (onchain-verified, Re reUSD only): ~$14.96M across Fluid, Curve, and Blackhole (~8.0% of ~$186.7M market cap). Fluid reUSD/USDT (~$11.62M) is the dominant venue (~78% of DEX depth). Significantly smaller than the initial "~$26.2M" figure, which erroneously included Resupply-reUSD Curve pools.
- 24h Trading Volume (token-level, CoinGecko): ~$7.3M.
- Instant redemption buffer (Apr 17, 2026, onchain): The Daily Instant Redemption Vault at
0x5C454f5526e41fBE917b63475CD8CA7E4631B147holds0USDC and6.188MsUSDe. ThecustodialWallet(labeled "Redemption Reserves Custodian" in this report)0x9eA38e09F41A9DE53972a68268BA0Dcc6d2fAdf8is an EOA and holds0USDC and53.263MsUSDe. The configureddayPayoutTokenis sUSDe (not USDC) on Apr 17, 2026, so instant redemptions settle into sUSDe under current config. - Instant Redemption Interaction Contract:
0x8aEb9453EF22Cb38abC7a3Af9c208F65C1BfE31e— exposesredeemInstant(uint256 shares, uint256 minPayout)for instant redemptions. - Onchain capital (Apr 17, 2026): ICL Custodial Wallet
0x295F67Fdb21255A3Db82964445628a706FBe689Eholds9.344MUSDC +10.496MsUSDe. ICL contract itself holds $0. - Quarterly queue: Pro-rata fulfillment, may not be fully met if capital is locked in reinsurance
- KYC required: Both for deposit and redemption through the protocol
- Multi-chain: Available on 6+ chains. Liquidity concentrated on Ethereum Curve pools (~$16M) with ~$1.5M on Avalanche.
Centralization & Control Risks
Governance
- Governance (onchain-verified): A Safe 3-of-5 multisig at
0x8EEc10616802Ef639ca55C98Ac856553FadeFbAd(SafeProxy; 5 owners, threshold 3) holds DEFAULT_ADMIN + UPGRADER on reUSD and ICL, and PROPOSER + CANCELLER on the Timelock. The protocol docs also describe additional MPC-controlled admin EOAs (Oracle, Redemptions, Access, Custodian); those EOAs exist onchain, but theN-of-MMPC quorum is offchain and cannot be verified.- Oracle admin EOA:
0x49BC5A88…9212A0ee— no timelock (directsetSharePricecapability implied). - Redemptions admin EOA:
0xEE16bE03…310c47f8. - Access admin EOA:
0x80a62B72…812fECAFc(administersAccessManager0x3f0DA1C363e34802C6f12F9C27276dC0e6696FD8; onchain-observed callinggrantRole/labelRole). - Custodian manager EOA:
0x9b6d7f2d…cEbE6eC9— holdsCUSTODIAN_MANAGER_ROLEon ICL (onchain-verified). - Timelock executor EOA:
0x4BFea59b…740738F3(onchain-verified).
- Oracle admin EOA:
- Upgrade Pattern: UUPS / ERC1967 upgradeable contracts (reUSD and ICL implementations verified).
- Upgrade Authority: Governance Safe → Timelock Controller (
0x69dDEa332723cF5407151aAF68B9b076557FCA93). TimelockgetMinDelay() = 172800seconds (48 hours, onchain-verified). - Timelock: 48-hour timelock on upgrades and role changes routed through Timelock. The
setSharePricepath has no onchain timelock or guardrail — price writes take effect immediately. - No onchain governance: Protocol is currently governed by an expert-led council (Resilience Foundation). Planned transition to DAO in the future.
- MPC signers: Re Team members — not publicly identified.
Programmability
- reUSD price: NOT programmatically computed. The NAV itself is produced offchain by a Chainlink Functions JS job, delivered onchain by
NAVConsumer, and stored inSharePriceCalculator. Onchain, the NAV Consumer enforces a 10% deviation cap per update (maxDeviationBps = 1000). No Chainlink PoR aggregator for reserves is consumed onchain (see the Chainlink usage appendix). The calculator itself has no guardrail onsetSharePrice; the admin EOA holds the role and can bypass the NAV Consumer path. - Deposits: Require KYC verification through the KYC Registry contract
- Redemptions: Instant redemptions are programmatic (from buffer). Quarterly redemptions involve admin-managed processes
- Capital deployment: Offchain, managed by the protocol team through the Fireblocks custody infrastructure
External Dependencies
- Chainlink: Verified onchain use is (a) Chainlink Functions + Automation driving the daily reUSD NAV/share-price update and (b) the Chainlink
sUSDe/USDprice feed used for collateral pricing. Docs claim reserve attestations are published via Chainlink, but no Chainlink PoR aggregator for Re reserves was verified. - The Network Firm: Third-party accountant for daily offchain reserve verification
- Ethena: USDe/sUSDe for basis-trade yield source
- Fireblocks: Custody for idle onchain capital (daily sweeps from ICL to Fireblocks vault)
- §114 Reinsurance Trust: Offchain U.S.-domiciled trust bank for regulatory collateral
- Cayman Reinsurer: Partner reinsurance company (CIMA-licensed, Class B(iii))
- SumSub / Chainalysis: KYC/AML verification
- Multiple blockchains: Cross-chain deployments on Ethereum, Avalanche, Arbitrum, Base, Katana, BNB Chain, Ink
Operational Risk
- Team: CEO Karn Saroya (publicly known, LinkedIn/Twitter). Previously co-founded Cover (YC-backed insurtech) and Stylekick (acquired by Shopify); part of early Shopify team. Reinsurance operations headed by former CEO of Willis Programs. Veteran team in insurance-tech for 10+ years.
- Company: Re (re.xyz). Founded 2022. Issuer entity: Resilience BVI Ltd. (British Virgin Islands, per RWA.xyz). Governance controlled by Resilience Foundation.
- Legal Structure: Partner reinsurance company domiciled in Cayman Islands, regulated by CIMA. Offchain trust accounts in U.S. jurisdiction (§114 Trust, NAIC-compliant banks). Token issuer domiciled in BVI.
- Investors: $14M seed round at $100M post-money valuation. Investors include Electric Capital, Tribe Capital, Stratos, SiriusPoint, Exor, Defy, Framework Ventures, Morgan Creek Digital.
- Custody: Re's public materials (
docs.re.xyz) name Fireblocks MPC custody for idle onchain assets. The AUP-Report-2025 corroborates that Re operates a Fireblocks MPC wallet set covering the 15 listed addresses but does not cryptographically verify the N-of-M quorum. Public documentation does not name specific banking counterparties for the offchain §114 Trust assets. - Documentation: Comprehensive documentation at docs.re.xyz. Clear description of mechanism, risks, and investor protections.
- Runtime Monitoring: ChainAnalysis for onchain transaction monitoring.
- Incident Response: Emergency pause mechanism exists. Recovery wallets designated for each ICL (e.g.,
0xDf6bF2713b5c7CA724E684657280bC407938F447for initial ICL). - KYC/AML: Required for all participants (SumSub + Chainalysis). Revoked KYC = request cancelled, tokens returned.
- Not available to U.S. persons and may be restricted in other jurisdictions.
- Written Premiums: $178M gross written premium to date (intro deck). $4B pipeline dealflow. Protocol has demonstrated real-world insurance business traction.
Monitoring
reUSD Price Monitoring
Share Price Calculator:
0xd1D104a7515989ac82F1AFDa15a23650411b05B8- Monitor reUSD price changes daily. Current: ~$1.072 (onchain
getSharePrice()=1072426668551449984, Apr 17, 2026). - Alert: If price decreases (should only ever increase under normal operation).
- Alert: If price growth stops for >48 hours (indicates oracle feed interruption or yield issue).
- Alert: Any new member granted
PRICE_SETTER_ROLEon the Share Price Calculator (currently0x6c15b25e…57649andNAVConsumer0x84d4eaeb…2b4b6). - Alert (Critical): Any
setSharePricecall whosemsg.senderis NOT theNAVConsumer— this is a bypass of the audited NAV path.
- Monitor reUSD price changes daily. Current: ~$1.072 (onchain
NAV Consumer (Chainlink Functions + Automation):
0x84d4eaeb10f9e57b67622f667c6c13e22fa4b2b6- Alert (Critical):
maxDeviationBpschanges (currently1000= 10%);deviationCheckEnabledflipped tofalse;automationEnabledflipped tofalse;pausedflipped totrue. - Alert (Critical): Any call to
forceNAVUpdate(admin override; minimum 4h interval). - Alert (Critical): Role changes on
DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE,ADMIN_ROLE,UPDATER_ROLE,EMERGENCY_UPDATER_ROLE,KEEPER_ROLE. - Alert (High):
configure(uint64,bytes32,string,bytes)— changes Chainlink Functions subscription / DON / source code. - Alert (High): Daily NAV update did not fire within the configured time window (default target 23:45 UTC).
- Alert (Critical):
ICL and Redemption Monitoring
reUSD ICL:
0x4691C475bE804Fa85f91c2D6D0aDf03114de3093- Monitor for large deposits/withdrawals (>$1M).
- Monitor total assets under management.
Daily Instant Redemption Vault:
0x5C454f5526e41fBE917b63475CD8CA7E4631B147- Monitor buffer balance. Alert if buffer drops below 1% of reUSD supply (triggers window-only mode).
- Monitor for rapid drawdowns indicating potential stress.
Reserve EOAs — primary custody risk: ~92% of onchain reserves are at three plain EOAs (of the 15 Fireblocks-MPC-controlled addresses listed in the AUP-Report-2025). No onchain outflow restriction applies.
- ICL Custodial Wallet (EOA):
0x295F67Fdb21255A3Db82964445628a706FBe689E— current balance ~$24.4M.- Alert (Critical): Any transfer (USDC / USDT / USDe / sUSDe) to a destination NOT on the historical allow-list (Ethena sUSDe/USDe contracts, Redemption Reserves Custodian, Daily Instant Redemption Vault, Fireblocks-pattern sweep addresses beginning
0x34b6…). First-time destinations = incident. - Alert (High): Any outbound transfer >$1M.
- Alert (Critical): Any transfer (USDC / USDT / USDe / sUSDe) to a destination NOT on the historical allow-list (Ethena sUSDe/USDe contracts, Redemption Reserves Custodian, Daily Instant Redemption Vault, Fireblocks-pattern sweep addresses beginning
- Redemption Reserves Custodian (EOA):
0x9eA38e09F41A9DE53972a68268BA0Dcc6d2fAdf8— current balance ~$65.4M.- Alert (Critical): Any sUSDe transfer to a destination NOT on the historical allow-list (only
0x5C45…B147RedemptionVault and sUSDe/USDe staking contracts observed to date). - Alert (High): Any single outbound >$5M.
- Alert (Critical): Any sUSDe transfer to a destination NOT on the historical allow-list (only
- Auxiliary custodian EOA
0xd4374008…B25831e9: — currently holds ~$2.6M in USDe+sUSDe. Listed in AUP, role undocumented publicly.- Alert (Critical): Any outbound transfer. Small size makes every movement worth a manual look.
- All 12 other AUP-listed addresses (currently empty or dust): monitor for any incoming deposit >$1M and then for any subsequent outgoing transfer. Sudden use of a previously-empty AUP address is a governance signal (either new custody rotation or an unauthorized movement).
- ICL Custodial Wallet (EOA):
Instant Redemption Interaction Contract:
0x8aEb9453EF22Cb38abC7a3Af9c208F65C1BfE31e- Monitor threshold value.
- Alert: On changes to daily or per-wallet redemption caps.
Governance & Upgrade Monitoring
Oracle admin EOA (MPC 3-of-5 per docs):
0x49BC5A880f77247A348764DdB95951cd9212A0ee- Alert: On any price feed configuration changes; on any new
PRICE_SETTER_ROLEgrant on Share Price Calculator.
- Alert: On any price feed configuration changes; on any new
Access admin EOA (MPC 5-of-8 per docs):
0x80a62B72dF1136aCBc57141FB67Aa46812fECAFc— admin ofAccessManager0x3f0DA1C363e34802C6f12F9C27276dC0e6696FD8- Alert: On any role assignment or revocation in
AccessManager; onMINTER_ROLEgrant on reUSD token.
- Alert: On any role assignment or revocation in
Governance Safe (3-of-5, onchain-verified):
0x8EEc10616802Ef639ca55C98Ac856553FadeFbAd- Alert: On any transaction execution, owner change, or threshold change.
Timelock Controller:
0x69dDEa332723cF5407151aAF68B9b076557FCA93— the 48h delay betweenCallScheduledandCallExecutedis the primary review window for any privileged action; the monitor must fire the moment something is queued, not when it executes.- Alert: On
CallScheduled(bytes32 id, uint256 index, address target, uint256 value, bytes data, bytes32 predecessor, uint256 delay)— decodetarget/dataand surface the decoded function call. Every scheduled call deserves a manual review before the 48h window expires. - Alert: On
CallExecuted(bytes32 id, uint256 index, address target, uint256 value, bytes data)— confirm the execution matches what was scheduled and did not diverge (OZ TimelockController replays the same payload, so any mismatch would be an upstream monitoring bug). - Alert: On
Cancelled(bytes32 id)— a Safe-initiated cancel is informational; a cancel originating from anything other than the Governance Safe (0x8EEc10…) or addresses withCANCELLER_ROLEis an incident.
- Alert: On
UUPS Proxy Upgrades: Monitor for
Upgradedevents on reUSD token and ICL contracts.- Alert: Immediately on any implementation change (48-hour timelock provides review window, so this should have been preceded by a
CallScheduledevent ≥48h earlier — absence of that precursor is an incident).
- Alert: Immediately on any implementation change (48-hour timelock provides review window, so this should have been preceded by a
Liquidity Monitoring
Fluid reUSD/USDT pool: Monitor TVL and volume. Largest trading venue by volume (~$11.6M TVL).
- Alert: If Fluid pool TVL drops below $5M.
Curve Re reUSD pools — only two pools actually pair Re's reUSD (
0x5086…0c72): reUSD/sUSDe and reUSD/USDC. (Curve pools labelled reUSD/scrvUSD, reUSD/sfrxUSD, reUSD/fxUSD, reUSD/sDOLA use Resupply's reUSD0x57aB1E00…and must NOT be monitored as Re liquidity.) Monitor TVL and balance ratio.- Alert: If total Curve Re reUSD DEX liquidity drops below $1M (currently ~$1.87M combined).
- Alert: If any pool imbalance exceeds 80/20 in either direction.
Avalanche Blackhole reUSD/USDC (CLMM + AMM, Re's reUSD
0x180aF87b…625Bf): Monitor TVL.- Alert: If combined Avalanche TVL drops below $500K (currently ~$1.47M).
CoinGecko reUSD price: Monitor for deviations from expected share price.
- Alert: If CoinGecko price deviates >2% from onchain share price.
Offchain Reserve Monitoring
The Network Firm attestation: the only Network Firm engagement publicly verified is the single Agreed-Upon Procedures report dated Oct 31, 2025 (published Dec 17, 2025). No onchain or public evidence establishes a daily or weekly cadence; the "daily attestation" phrasing in Re's docs is a protocol claim, not an observed publication pattern. No Chainlink PoR feed is consumed onchain, so reserve-attestation monitoring has to target Re's transparency channel directly.
- Action: before relying on an "X-hours stale" alert, confirm the actual publication cadence with Re or by observing the transparency dashboard for a calendar month.
- Alert: if reported reserves fall below total reUSD supply × share price.
- Alert: if a new AUP report appears with an address list that differs from the 15 addresses in
AUP-Report-2025.
Onchain coverage ratio: Compute
(USDC + USDT + USDe + sUSDe_in_USDe_terms)across all 15 Fireblocks-MPC-controlled addresses listed in the AUP-Report-2025, divided byreUSD Ethereum totalSupply × getSharePrice(). Currently ~54.0%.- Alert if coverage drops below 50% (Re's stated floor).
- Alert if coverage drops below 55% (headroom erosion).
- Alert if the sUSDe share of reserves exceeds 92% or the USDC share drops below 7% (current split: sUSDe ~88% / USDC ~9.3%).
- Alert on first appearance of BUIDL or another T-bill-wrapper balance at any reserve address.
Monitoring Frequency
| Category | Frequency | Priority |
|---|---|---|
Timelock CallScheduled / CallExecuted / Cancelled / MinDelayChange |
Real-time | Critical |
| Governance Safe tx execution / owner / threshold changes | Real-time | Critical |
| UUPS proxy upgrade events | Real-time | Critical |
| Access role changes (reUSD MINTER_ROLE, ICL admin, Timelock PROPOSER/EXECUTOR/CANCELLER) | Real-time | Critical |
Share Price Calculator PRICE_SETTER_ROLE grant / revoke |
Real-time | Critical |
| Instant redemption cap changes | Real-time | Critical |
| reUSD share price | Daily | High |
| Instant redemption buffer (USDC + sUSDe) | Every 6 hours | High |
| Onchain coverage ratio (reserves / NAV) + composition | Every 6 hours | High |
| Instant redemption interaction events | Every 6 hours | High |
| The Network Firm offchain attestation publication | Daily | High |
| DEX pool TVL/balance (Fluid reUSD/USDT + Curve) | Hourly | Medium |
| Total supply changes (Ethereum + cross-chain) | Daily | Medium |
Reassessment Triggers
- Time-based: Reassess in 6 months (September 2026) or sooner if instant redemption vault remains empty for >30 days
- Governance-based: Reassess after roles are changed, or funds are
- Incident-based: Reassess after any exploit, governance change, reinsurer insolvency, or material claim event
- Liquidity-based: Reassess if DEX liquidity drops below $5M or if instant redemption vault remains empty for >30 days
- Regulatory-based: Reassess if CIMA regulatory status changes or new jurisdictional restrictions apply
Appendix: Contract Architecture
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ VAULT / TOKEN LAYER │
│ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │
│ │ reUSD Token │◄──│ Share Price │◄── PRICE_SETTER_ROLE │
│ │ (ERC-20, │ │ Calculator │ (EOA calls │
│ │ UUPS Proxy) │ │ 0xd1D1..11b05B8 │ setSharePrice) │
│ │ 0x5086..0c72 │ └──────────────────────┘ │
│ └──────┬───────┘ (NAVConsumer: 10% onchain deviation cap; │
│ admin EOA can bypass via direct setSharePrice) │
│ │ mint/burn │
│ ┌──────▼───────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Insurance Capital Layer │───►│ ICL Custodial Wallet │ │
│ │ (ICL) │ │ (Fireblocks) │ │
│ │ 0x4691..3093 │ │ 0x295F..689E │ │
│ └──────┬───────────────────┘ └───────────┬─────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌──────▼───────────────────┐ │ sweep │
│ │ Daily Instant Redemption │ ▼ │
│ │ Vault │ ┌──────────────────────┐ │
│ │ 0x5C45..B147 │ │ Offchain Deployment │ │
│ └──────────────────────────┘ │ (offchain §114 Trust)│ │
│ └──────────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ PROTOCOL LAYER │
│ │
│ ┌────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Deposit Token │ │ KYC Registry │ │
│ │ Registry │ │ (SumSub/Chainalysis)│ │
│ │ 0x73d3..03F6 │ │ 0x82F1..9995 │ │
│ └────────────────────┘ └────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Decentralized Fund │ │ Redemption Reserves│ │
│ │ 0xF044..72f2 │ │ Custodian (EOA) │ │
│ └────────────────────┘ │ 0x9eA3..ADF8 │ │
│ └────────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ UNDERLYING LAYER │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ │
│ │ Chainlink │ │ The Network Firm │ │ §114 Reinsurance│ │
│ │ (Price Feed + │ │ (Daily offchain │ │ Trust (U.S.) │ │
│ │ Proof of │ │ attestation) │ │ Cash + T-Bills │ │
│ │ Reserve) │ │ │ │ │ │
│ └─────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ │
│ │ Ethena (USDe) │ │ Cayman Reinsurer │ │
│ │ (Basis trade │ │ (CIMA-licensed, │ │
│ │ yield source) │ │ Class B(iii)) │ │
│ └─────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ GOVERNANCE │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Oracle Admin EOA │ │ Redemptions Admin │ │
│ │ MPC 3-of-5 (docs) │ │ MPC 3-of-5 (docs) │ │
│ │ 0x49BC..0Aee │ │ 0xEE16..47f8 │ │
│ │ no onchain timelock │ │ 48h timelock (docs) │ │
│ └─────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Access Admin EOA │ │ Custodian Manager │ │
│ │ MPC 5-of-8 (docs) │ │ (CUSTODIAN_MGR_ROLE)│ │
│ │ 0x80a6..AFc │ │ 0x9b6d..eC9 │ │
│ │ admins AccessManager│ │ Add/remove │ │
│ │ 0x3f0D..6FD8 │ │ custodians (ICL) │ │
│ └─────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Governance Safe (3-of-5, onchain) │ │
│ │ 0x8EEc10..FadeFbAd │ │
│ │ DEFAULT_ADMIN + UPGRADER on reUSD and ICL; │ │
│ │ PROPOSER + CANCELLER on Timelock │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Timelock Controller (getMinDelay = 48h) │ │
│ │ 0x69dDEa..57FCA93 │ │
│ │ Executor: 0x4BFea59b..740738F3 (EOA) │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Fund Flow:
User ──USDC──► ICL (KYC gate) ──mint──► reUSD Token
ICL ──sweep──► Custodial Wallet ──deploy──► §114 Trust (offchain)
§114 Trust ──surplus notes──► ICL (principal + yield guarantee)
Network Firm attestation ──► PRICE_SETTER EOA ──► setSharePrice on Share Price Calc ──► reUSD price
Network Firm ──► offchain reserve attestation (no Chainlink PoR consumed onchain)
Chainlink sUSDe/USD ──► SimpleOracle ──► PriceRouter (sUSDe leg only)
Trust Boundaries:
⚠ Onchain/offchain boundary at ICL Custodial Wallet sweep
⚠ Share price is written by an admin EOA with no onchain deviation cap
⚠ Redemption Reserves Custodian (0x9eA3..ADF8) is an EOA
⚠ MINTER_ROLE held by THREE contracts on reUSD (ICL, InstantRedemption, ShareTokenMinterBurner)
⚠ KYC Registry gates all deposits and protocol redemptions
Appendix: Chainlink usage by Re Protocol — what is real vs what is marketing
Verified Apr 17, 2026.
Re's documentation ties the protocol's reserve and price publication to Chainlink. The relevant quotes:
| Source page | Quote |
|---|---|
| Security and Audits | "Off-chain bank balances are verified daily by The Network Firm and published via Chainlink. The Network Firm also verifies ownership and balances of protocol custody wallets." |
| How the Re Protocol Works | "Idle funds are held in a Fireblocks vault under multisig. Balances are published daily to a Chainlink oracle. Proof-of-reserves, publicly auditable." |
| How the Re Protocol Works | "On-Chain Mirror: Trust balances, premium inflows, and claim outflows are hashed and pushed to Chainlink, giving 24/7 proof of funds." |
| How the Re Protocol Works | "Chainlink Oracles: Publish price feeds, trust balances, surplus-note schedules, and redemption queues." |
| What is reUSD? | "A JSON price feed is pushed on-chain via Chainlink" |
What's actually onchain (three Chainlink integrations, verified):
- Chainlink Price Feed —
sUSDe / USD(0xFF3BC18cCBd5999CE63E788A1c250a88626aD099) wrapped bySimpleOracle0xb6aD3633…fB4Dand read byPriceRouter. Used for the sUSDe collateral-pricing leg. - Chainlink Functions —
NAVConsumer0x84d4eaeb…2b4b6subscribes to the mainnet DONfun-ethereum-mainnet-1(subscription85). A JS job in the DON computes the daily NAV offchain and the result is written onchain viafulfillRequest→navReceiver.setSharePrice→SharePriceCalculator. - Chainlink Automation — a keeper calls
NAVConsumer.performUpkeep(bytes)daily (observed every ~86400 s; target time 23:45 UTC). This is what triggers (2).
So Re's claim "A JSON price feed is pushed on-chain via Chainlink" is correct in a loose sense: the NAV is produced by Chainlink Functions and pushed by Chainlink Automation, even though it's not a classic Chainlink "price feed aggregator". The NAV Oracle code was audited by Hacken in Apr 2025 (repo github.com/resilience-foundation/nav-oracle).
What is NOT onchain — the "Proof-of-Reserves, publicly auditable" claim:
- Chainlink's public PoR directory does not list Re. The canonical list at
reference-data-directory.vercel.app/feeds-mainnet.jsonhas 23 Proof-of-Reserve feeds on Ethereum mainnet (FBTC, cbBTC, TUSD, eETH, Lombard, WBTC, M / MetaMask, C1USD, …). No feed matchingreusd,resilience,re-protocol, orre_usdexists — nor on Avalanche (93 feeds) or BSC (178 feeds). - No Re contract consumes a PoR aggregator.
InsuranceCapitalLayer,ShareToken,SharePriceCalculator,PriceRouter,SharePriceOracle, and the Redemption contracts make nolatestRoundDatacall against a reserves feed. The@chainlink/imports that appear inPriceRouterandSharePriceOracleare foundry path remappings, not live integrations. - Chainlink's own media has no announcement, case study, or press release about a Re Protocol integration.
- What the NAV Oracle publishes is the share price, not reserves. It does not hash trust balances, premium inflows, or claim outflows onto Chainlink as Re's docs imply.
Bottom line:
- "JSON price feed pushed via Chainlink" → true (Functions + Automation, verified onchain).
- "Published via Chainlink oracle (for offchain bank balances)" → not verified; no such feed exists in Chainlink's registry and no Re contract reads one.
- "Proof-of-reserves, publicly auditable" → overclaim; reserve assurance is (a) direct onchain balance audit of the ICL/vault/custodian addresses and (b) The Network Firm's offchain AUP — there is no Chainlink-signed reserves oracle to cross-check either.
Action: when evaluating "Chainlink" claims in Re's docs, distinguish between Chainlink Functions + Automation (used for the share price, real and audited) vs a Chainlink PoR aggregator for reserves (does not exist onchain). If Re asserts the latter in conversation, ask for the aggregator address — it should be in Chainlink's mainnet directory and verifiable on Etherscan.