InfiniFi

Contract Addresses

All contracts verified on Blockscout/Etherscan. Compiled with Solidity 0.8.28 (except Gnosis Safe: 0.7.6).

• iUSD (ReceiptToken): 0x48f9e38f3070AD8945DFEae3FA70987722E3D89c — ERC20, restricted mint/burn via CoreControlled roles
• siUSD (StakedToken): 0xDBDC1Ef57537E34680B898E1FEBD3D68c7389bCB — ERC4626 vault wrapping iUSD
• InfiniFiCore (AccessControl): 0xF6d48735EcCf12bDC1DF2674b1ce3fcb3bD25490 — Central AccessControlEnumerable, 17+ roles. DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE has 0 holders (renounced).
• Gateway (Proxy): 0x3f04b65Ddbd87f9CE0A2e7Eb24d80e7fb87625b5 — TransparentUpgradeableProxy → InfiniFiGatewayV3 (0xb44e494535A8fC1f0081F4F9289BCc7c57FbffB6)
• Gateway ProxyAdmin: 0x21071E0f9D600571Ffe47873e95fffF2FAc9141c — Owned by Long Timelock (7-day delay for upgrades)
• Liquid Farms (Instant Liquidity):
  • Fluid USDC (ERC4626Farm): 0x1484d6C834Ac99B9E50B17e57F85C8603F65657A — targets fUSDC vault
  • Euler Sentora USDC (ERC4626Farm): 0x6FBc446f25Ab5141C4F7E7711E52DFc0AdA407A5 — targets eUSDC-70 EVK vault
  • Aave v3 Horizon (AaveV3Farm): 0x817d93DbdFd8190bbef0a73fCf5Dd9DA5A87E032 — targets aHorRwaUSDC
  • Spark USDC Vault (SparkSUSDCFarm): 0xd880D7C5CaFdbE2AEc281250995abF612235e563 — targets sUSDC
  • Aave (AaveV3Farm): 0xbFd5FC8DecA3C6128bfCE0FE46c25616811c3580 — targets aEthUSDC
• Team Multisig: 0x80608f852D152024c0a2087b16939235fEc2400c — Gnosis Safe v1.4.1, 4/7 threshold, 7 EOA signers, nonce 287
• Long Timelock (7 days): 0x3D18480CC32B6AB3B833dCabD80E76CfD41c48a9 — 604,800s delay
• Short Timelock (1 day): 0x4B174afbeD7b98BA01F50E36109EEE5e6d327c32 — 86,400s delay

Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures

InfiniFi has undergone extensive security review via Certora, Spearbit/Cantina Code, and a Cantina public competition, plus multiple ongoing upgrade reviews.

• Spearbit / Cantina Code (March-April 2025): Main protocol security review. Report published April 1, 2025. Findings: 8 High, 6 Medium, 25 Low, 4 Gas, 24 Informational. Auditors: Noah Marconi (Lead), R0bert (Lead), Slowfi, Jonatas Martins. Report PDF.
• Certora: Formal Verification & Security Assessment (March 21 – May 20, 2025). Report published June 4, 2025. Covers formal verification via Certora Prover and manual review. Report.
• Cantina Public Competition (April 2025): Public audit competition. Competition link. Reward pool claimed ~$40,000 ($35k + $5k) — amount unconfirmed via automation.
• Ongoing Cantina Code / Spearbit Managed Reviews (6+ additional reviews of upgrades):
  • siUSD rewards interpolation update
  • Pendle SY farm integration
  • Multiasset farms (new farm types)
  • PR 209: Multiple new farms
  • PR 228: J-Curve Smoother, ReservoirFarm, Fluid rewards
  • PR 224: Crosschain support (CCIP + LayerZero) All PDFs accessible via auditor portfolio. Note: The initial Spearbit audit and "Cantina Code" review appear to be the same engagement (same auditors, same date, same file size). They should not be counted as separate audits.

Bug Bounty

• Bug Bounty Program on Cantina

Historical Track Record

• Production History: The protocol launched in June 2025 with a points program beginning June 1, 2025, designed to reward participation during its six month launch phase.
• TVL: $177.69M. (03.02.26)
• Incidents: No reported security incidents or exploits found.
• Peg Stability: iUSD is designed to be redeemable 1:1. Users can mint iUSD against deposits.

Funds Management

The protocol acts as an asset manager, deploying user funds into other protocols.

• Strategy: Funds are deployed into liquid DeFi platforms (Aave, Fluid, Euler, Spark) and illiquid fixed-maturity strategies (Pendle, Ethena, Gauntlet Frontier vaults, Reservoir wsrUSD, Fasanara Genesis Fund, Tokemak autoUSD). Critical: Several illiquid farms involve high-risk strategies including RWA exposure and explicit insolvency risk (see Appendix A).
• Asset Allocation: As of February 2026, $37.78M (21%) is held in Liquid Farms (instant withdrawal available) and $139.91M (79%) in Illiquid Farms (locked maturity).
• Risk Hierarchy: Losses are socialized based on a "liability ladder":
  1. liUSD (Locked) holders take the first loss.
  2. siUSD (Staked) holders take the next loss.
  3. iUSD (Stablecoin) holders are the last to be affected.

Accessibility

• Minting: Users deposit supported assets (USDC, USDT, USDe, sUSDe) to mint iUSD.

• Redemption:

  • Instant: Users can instantly redeem iUSD for USDC as long as there is sufficient liquidity in the Liquid Farms (currently ~$37.78M). No queue, whitelisting not required, anyone can redeem. When this reserve is depleted, there will be a FIFO queue.

  • Queue: If liquid reserves are depleted, redemption requests enter a FIFO Queue. Pending requests are fulfilled as capital is unwound from illiquid strategies or new deposits enter.

  • Whitelisting: No whitelist for redemption; anyone holding iUSD can redeem or enter the queue.

Collateralization

• Backing: iUSD is backed by the assets deployed in the underlying strategies.
• Verification: The protocol uses a "Self-Laddering Engine" to match asset duration with liability duration (locked periods).
• Offchain Risks: CRITICAL: Despite initial appearance of "100% onchain DeFi", the protocol deploys into strategies with significant offchain exposure:
  • Reservoir wsrUSD: Backed by Real World Assets (RWAs) including T-Bills, introducing offchain custodial risk, asset valuation complexity, and illiquidity during crisis.
  • Fasanara Genesis Fund: Tokenized traditional hedge fund/money market fund, likely includes institutional credit and RWA exposure similar to Maple.
  • Gauntlet Frontier vaults: Explicitly labeled as "higher-risk/higher-yield" strategies that "may lead to higher risks of insolvency" per Gauntlet's own documentation.
  • Tokemak autoUSD: Multi-protocol aggregator adding compounded smart contract risk and algorithmic allocation dependency.
• Token Breakdown: 115.07M siUSD (Staked), 43.34M liUSD (Locked), 24.86M iUSD (Liquid/Unstaked).

Provability

• Transparency: Reserves and allocations are verifiable onchain.
• Reserves: $37.78M in liquid reserves.

Liquidity Risk

• Exit Liquidity:
  • iUSD: $3.3M onchain DEX liquidity. Instant redemptions against the $37.78M liquid reserve.
  • Coverage: The $37.78M liquid reserve fully covers the circulating unstaked iUSD supply (24.86M).
    • siUSD: The holders of siUSD can exit with this flow: siUSD --> iUSD --> USDC.
    • liUSD: Locked (1-13 weeks) but represented by a transferable ERC20 token, allowing for potential secondary market exit.
• Withdrawal Queues: "Only time there'd be a queue is if there was a mass withdrawal event & these funds depleted." The protocol manages this via the liability ladder and keeping significant liquid reserves.

Centralization & Control Risks

Governance

The governance system is split into three branches to check and balance power:

1. Allocators (Active Management): Decide "How much" capital goes to specific strategies. They cannot route funds to arbitrary addresses.
   • Timelock: Changes to capital allocation parameters (e.g., Farm Registry updates) use the Short Timelock (1 day delay).
2. Verifiers (Token Holders - liUSD): Vote to approve the "Allowlist" of safe protocols.
   • Scope: Adding a new protocol to the allowlist requires a governance vote and must pass through the Short Timelock (1 day delay).
3. Vetoers (Guardians): A council of 5 entities. A single Vetoer can block any new protocol or product. This acts as a safety brake.

• Team Multisig: Gnosis Safe v1.4.1 at 0x80608f852D152024c0a2087b16939235fEc2400c. 4/7 threshold, 7 anonymous EOA signers.

  #	Signer	Additional Roles
  1	0x7055E782B94b15BB6142aaFB326a9CeC36399eE5	—
  2	0xDAdB38219425c761dd0f3a4d684Fc36f533af7bD	EXECUTOR_ROLE (timelock)
  3	0xa9BDBEb17c81677Cb1830B74B1832C16Ec5CEF61	—
  4	0x6DFa1A32604088EB969242AafFb92420F78373f6	EXECUTOR_ROLE (timelock)
  5	0xd53Ffb2DB125015aB4D461bAD3fA959Ef1a1e685	PAUSE
  6	0xfd4691dfA327Adb0d6f3c7b4224B3cc881D4F6fa	EXECUTOR_ROLE (timelock)
  7	0x383965940c950008a4B67BfaA477Fdf6AC91a7F7	EXECUTOR_ROLE (timelock), PAUSE

• Timelocks: Both are custom Timelock.sol extending OZ TimelockController. They override hasRole() to delegate role checks to the central InfiniFiCore contract. Both have DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE renounced (immutable role configuration).

  • Long Timelock (7 days): 0x3D18480CC32B6AB3B833dCabD80E76CfD41c48a9 — 604,800s confirmed onchain.
  • Short Timelock (1 day): 0x4B174afbeD7b98BA01F50E36109EEE5e6d327c32 — 86,400s confirmed onchain.

  Role assignments on both timelocks (verified onchain via InfiniFiCore):

  Role	Holder(s)
  PROPOSER_ROLE	Multisig (4/7 required to schedule)
  CANCELLER_ROLE	Multisig (4/7 required to cancel)
  EXECUTOR_ROLE	5 individual EOAs: signers #2, #4, #6, #7 + deployer EOA (0xdecaDAc8778D088A30eE811b8Cc4eE72cED9Bf22)

  Governance flow: Multisig proposes (4/7) → Timelock delay → Any 1 of 5 executor EOAs triggers execution.

• GOVERNOR role holders (3 contracts, verified on InfiniFiCore):

  • Long Timelock (0x3D18480CC32B6AB3B833dCabD80E76CfD41c48a9)
  • MinorRolesManager (0xa08Bf802dCecd3c44E6420a52d5158867366be9b) — can only grant/revoke PAUSE, PERIODIC_REBALANCER, FARM_SWAP_CALLER
  • FluidRewardsClaimer (0xD0ec80032C0da717BD78B9569321D9069365241E) — can only claim Fluid rewards
  • Deployer EOA has properly renounced GOVERNOR. DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE has 0 holders on Core.

• Actions by timelock tier:

  Long Timelock (7 days) — GOVERNOR role: enableBucket, setMaxLossPercentage, setAddress (gateway), setAfterMintHook, setBeforeRedeemHook, setYieldSharing, enableAsset, disableAsset, setLendingPool, setSafeAddress, emergencyAction, proxy upgrades (owns ProxyAdmin), all role grants/revokes (except MinorRolesManager-delegated roles)

  Short Timelock (1 day) — PROTOCOL_PARAMETERS role: setBucketMultiplier, setMinAssetAmount, setSafetyBufferSize, setPerformanceFeeAndRecipient, setLiquidReturnMultiplier, setTargetIlliquidRatio, setCap, setMaxSlippage, addFarms, removeFarms, setEnabledRouter, setPendleRouter, setCooldown, setAssetRebalanceThreshold

  Short Timelock (1 day) — ORACLE_MANAGER role: setOracle, setPrice Note: ORACLE_MANAGER has 4 holders: Short Timelock + Accounting contract + YieldSharingV2 contract + Oracle Factory contract.

  Multisig WITHOUT timelock:

  Role	Capability
  UNPAUSE	Unpause any paused contract
  EMERGENCY_WITHDRAWAL	Move funds from farms to predefined safe address, deprecate farms
  MANUAL_REBALANCER	Rebalance funds between whitelisted farms
  FARM_SWAP_CALLER	Trigger swap operations in farms
  MINOR_ROLES_MANAGER	Grant/revoke PAUSE, PERIODIC_REBALANCER, FARM_SWAP_CALLER via MinorRolesManager contract

• PAUSE role holders (4 individual EOAs can pause the protocol without multisig/timelock):

  • 0x383965940c950008a4B67BfaA477Fdf6AC91a7F7 (multisig signer #7)
  • 0xd53Ffb2DB125015aB4D461bAD3fA959Ef1a1e685 (multisig signer #5)
  • 0x6ef71cA9cD708883E129559F5edBFb9d9D5C1d8A
  • 0x0652412777f0c1F46b1164d5cdF3295Bdf43F2f2

• emergencyAction bypass analysis: The Timelock.sol contract overrides emergencyAction to a no-op, preventing any GOVERNOR holder from using it to bypass timelock delays. This is a deliberate safety mechanism confirmed in source code.

Programmability

• Hybrid Model: The "Self-Laddering Engine" algorithmically matches asset duration with liability duration. "Allocators" actively manage the amount of capital deployed to specific allowlisted strategies.
• Oracle: Protocol uses Chainlink price feeds for asset pricing to maintain the 1:1 mint ratio and calculate collateral value.
• Oracle Updates: Oracles are upgradeable via governance (Short Timelock, 1-day delay). The iUSD price oracle (0x8ABc952f91dB6695E765744ae340BC5eA4B344c1) is a FixedPriceOracle — price changes only during loss socialization events (de-peg).

External Dependencies

• Dependency: Heavily dependent on the performance and security of Aave, Fluid, Pendle, and Ethena. A failure in any of these protocols would result in losses (absorbed first by liUSD).
• Stablecoins: Dependent on USDC, USDT, USDe, sUSDe pegs.

Operational Risk

• Team: InfiniFi Labs. Pseudonymous/semi-anonymous team. Key contributors identified via GitHub:
  • eswak (Erwan Beauvois): Lead architect. Former Fei Protocol core dev (2021-2022), Ethereum Credit Guild core dev (2022-2024). Toulouse, France.
  • RobAnon (@RobAnon94): Contributor. Former sole developer of Revest Finance core contracts. Note: Revest Finance was exploited for ~$2M via reentrancy in March 2022.
  • nikollamalic (Nikola Malic): Developer. Former Revest Finance infrastructure contributor.
  • No public team page. GitHub org has zero public members listed.
• Funding: $3M Pre-Seed (Feb 2025) led by Electric Capital, with participation from New Form Capital, Axiom, Kraynos Capital, Sam Kazemian (Frax Finance founder), Defi Dad.
• Legal Structure: No disclosed legal entity, jurisdiction, or DAO structure. TODO.
• Documentation: Technical documentation in the GitHub README is comprehensive. Public docs at docs.infinifi.xyz behind Cloudflare protection (content not independently verified).
• Communication: Twitter/X at @infinifilabs. No public governance forum found (not on Snapshot, Tally, or Commonwealth).
• Incident Response: No documented incident response plan found. Emergency capabilities exist via EMERGENCY_WITHDRAWAL role (multisig, no timelock) and system pause (4 individual EOAs).

Monitoring

Contracts to Monitor

Contract	Address	Why Monitor Directly
Long Timelock	0x3D18480CC32B6AB3B833dCabD80E76CfD41c48a9	All critical governance actions (GOVERNOR role)
Short Timelock	0x4B174afbeD7b98BA01F50E36109EEE5e6d327c32	Parameter changes (PROTOCOL_PARAMETERS, ORACLE_MANAGER)
EmergencyWithdrawal	0xa406aFC7967C63C5c454AD1f0e0dB9a761fe26e9	Multisig-direct, no timelock
ORACLE_IUSD	0x8ABc952f91dB6695E765744ae340BC5eA4B344c1	De-peg event (autonomous, triggered by loss socialization)
LockingController	0x1d95cC100D6Cd9C7BbDbD7Cb328d99b3D6037fF7	First-loss buffer for liUSD holders. LossesApplied = protocol taking damage. Auto-pauses if losses exceed maxLossPercentage threshold.
siUSD	0xDBDC1Ef57537E34680B898E1FEBD3D68c7389bCB	VaultLoss = losses exceeded liUSD first-loss buffer, now hitting siUSD stakers
UnwindingModule	0x7092A43aE5407666C78dBEa657a1891f42b3dFcc	Handles forced liquidation of illiquid positions (e.g. Pendle fixed-term). CriticalLoss = losses during unwinding exceed module balance.

Note: Contracts whose state changes only via timelocks (InfiniFiCore, Gateway, FarmRegistry, Accounting, MintController, RedeemController, YieldSharingV2, MinorRolesManager, JCurveSmoother, etc.) do not need separate monitoring — all their changes appear as CallScheduled/CallExecuted on the timelocks.

Governance Monitoring (Timelocks + Multisig)

All timelocked actions (GOVERNOR, PROTOCOL_PARAMETERS, ORACLE_MANAGER) are captured by monitoring the timelock events. No need to separately monitor downstream contract events that can only be triggered via timelocks.

Contract	Event	Significance
Long/Short Timelock	CallScheduled(bytes32 id, uint256 index, address target, uint256 value, bytes data, bytes32 predecessor, uint256 delay)	New governance action proposed — decode data to understand what will change. Early warning window (7d or 1d).
Long/Short Timelock	CallExecuted(bytes32 id, uint256 index, address target, uint256 value, bytes data)	Governance action executed — verify expected outcome
Long/Short Timelock	Cancelled(bytes32 id)	Scheduled action cancelled — may indicate contested governance
Long/Short Timelock	MinDelayChange(uint256 oldDuration, uint256 newDuration)	Timelock delay changed — reduction is critical

Non-Timelocked Events — Immediate Alert

These events bypass the timelock and can be triggered directly by the multisig or individual role holders.

Contract	Event	Triggered By	Significance
Any CoreControlled	Paused(address account)	4 individual PAUSE EOAs	Emergency pause — no multisig or timelock required
Any CoreControlled	Unpaused(address account)	Multisig (UNPAUSE, no timelock)	System resumed
EmergencyWithdrawal	EmergencyWithdraw(uint256 timestamp, address farm, uint256 amount)	Multisig (no timelock)	Emergency fund extraction from farm

Protocol Health Events — Immediate Alert

Autonomous events triggered by protocol state, not governance actions.

Contract	Event	Significance
ORACLE_IUSD	PriceSet(uint256 timestamp, uint256 price)	iUSD price changed — price below 1.0 = de-peg (loss socialization to iUSD holders)
LockingController	LossesApplied(uint256 timestamp, uint256 amount)	First-loss tranche consuming — liUSD holders taking losses
siUSD	VaultLoss(uint256 timestamp, uint256 epoch, uint256 assets)	Losses cascading past first-loss tranche to siUSD holders
UnwindingModule	CriticalLoss(uint256 timestamp, uint256 amount)	Losses during forced liquidation of illiquid positions exceed module balance

Key State to Poll

• TVL: Monitor total protocol TVL via liquid + illiquid farm balances
• Liquid Reserve Ratio: Liquid reserves vs total TVL

Reassessment Triggers

• Time-based: Reassess in 6 months (August 2026) — protocol will have >1 year history
• TVL-based: Reassess if TVL changes by more than 50%
• Incident-based: Reassess after any exploit, governance change, collateral modification, or signer change on the multisig
• Farm-based: Reassess if protocol adds new high-risk farms or significantly changes allocation to existing high-risk farms (Gauntlet Frontier, Reservoir, Fasanara, autoUSD)

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Appendix A: High-Risk Illiquid Farm Analysis

InfiniFi deploys a significant portion of its assets into illiquid farms (locked until maturity). Analysis of the InfiniFi Transparency Dashboard reveals deployment into several high-risk strategies that warrant detailed examination. These farms introduce risks beyond standard DeFi protocols and materially impact the overall risk profile.

Summary Table: High-Risk Illiquid Farms

Farm Name	Type	Primary Risk	Off-Chain Exposure	Liquidity	Individual Risk Score
Gauntlet Alpha (gtUSDa)	Morpho vault aggregator	Explicit insolvency risk	Minimal (onchain DeFi)	Locked until maturity	4.0/5
Reservoir wsrUSD	RWA-backed stablecoin	Offchain custodial, RWA valuation	High (T-Bills, institutional)	Locked until maturity	4.5/5
Fasanara Genesis Fund	Tokenized TradFi fund	Traditional finance risk, opacity	Very High (hedge fund assets)	Locked until maturity	4.5/5
Tokemak autoUSD	Multi-protocol aggregator	Compounded smart contract risk	Minimal (DeFi protocols)	Locked until maturity	3.5/5

Detailed Farm Risk Assessments

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1. Gauntlet Alpha (gtUSDa) - Frontier Vault Deployment

Risk Score: 4.0/5

Description: Gauntlet USD Alpha is a multi-strategy vault that provides cross-chain yield on stablecoins. Gauntlet operates three risk tiers: Prime (ultra-conservative), Core (balanced), and Frontier (high-risk/high-yield). Evidence suggests InfiniFi is deploying into Gauntlet Frontier vaults, the highest-risk tier.

Explicit Risk Warnings from Gauntlet:

Per Gauntlet's Frontier Vault announcement:

"The Gauntlet USDC Frontier Vault targets maximum yield by allocating to potentially higher volatility markets that may face liquidity risks in exchange for the potential of greater supplier returns."

"Gauntlet Frontier Vaults offer the highest yields, allocating to riskier markets that may lead to higher risks of insolvency."

Key Risk Factors:

Risk Category	Assessment	Details
Smart Contract Risk	High	Multi-layer exposure: InfiniFi → Gauntlet → Frontier → Morpho Markets → underlying lending markets
Insolvency Risk	Very High	Explicitly acknowledged by Gauntlet in product documentation
Liquidity Risk	Very High	Frontier vaults target "potentially higher volatility markets that may face liquidity risks"
Transparency	Medium	Allocation decisions made by Gauntlet algorithms, full position breakdown requires monitoring Morpho markets
Offchain Risk	Low	Primarily onchain DeFi protocols

Why This Matters:

• InfiniFi's liability ladder (liUSD → siUSD → iUSD) assumes losses will be gradual and manageable
• A Gauntlet Frontier insolvency event could create sudden, large losses that exhaust the liUSD first-loss buffer rapidly
• InfiniFi funds are locked until maturity in this farm — cannot quickly exit even if risk escalates
• During a crisis, Gauntlet Frontier may face redemption queues or emergency withdrawals, potentially forcing fire sales

Mitigating Factors:

• Gauntlet has strong risk management reputation and uses Agent-Based Simulations for allocation
• Multiple audits and ongoing monitoring by Gauntlet team
• Morpho Markets architecture provides some risk isolation

References:

• Gauntlet Frontier Vaults Announcement
• Gauntlet VaultBook - Morpho Vaults

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2. Reservoir wsrUSD (Wrapped Savings rUSD)

Risk Score: 4.5/5

Description: Wrapped Savings rUSD is the yield-bearing wrapper of Reservoir's rUSD stablecoin. Reservoir is a multicollateral stablecoin protocol backed by Real World Assets (RWAs) and onchain strategies including T-Bills, overcollateralized onchain lending, and funding rate strategies.

Key Risk Factors:

Risk Category	Assessment	Details
Off-Chain Custodial Risk	Very High	T-Bills and RWAs require trusted custodians to hold offchain assets
Asset Valuation Risk	Very High	RWA valuations depend on external oracles, appraisers, and market conditions; not verifiable onchain
Liquidity Risk	Very High	During crisis, selling RWAs (T-Bills) can be slow, expensive, or impossible; cannot instantly redeem like onchain DeFi
Counterparty Risk	Very High	Institutional custodians, T-Bill issuers, banking infrastructure required
Transparency	Low	Full composition of RWA backing not fully transparent; institutional relationships opaque
Regulatory Risk	High	RWAs subject to securities laws, potential regulatory action could freeze assets
Smart Contract Risk	Medium	Standard DeFi risks plus integration with offchain infrastructure

Why This Matters:

• Contradicts "100% onchain" claim: Initial assessment stated "100% onchain DeFi assets. No offchain or custodial holdings" — this is false.
• Traditional finance failure modes: If T-Bill custodian faces issues (bankruptcy, regulatory freeze, operational failure), assets could become inaccessible
• Valuation manipulation risk: RWA values can be manipulated or become stale during market stress
• Redemption mismatch: Reservoir may implement redemption queues if RWA liquidation cannot keep pace with outflows
• InfiniFi's locked position: Cannot quickly exit if Reservoir faces RWA-related issues

Stated Mitigations (from Reservoir):

Per Reservoir documentation:

• Peg Stability Module: Allows conversion of rUSD to USDC at parity with no cost
• Credit Enforcer: Automatically checks liquidity ratios, asset ratios, and capital ratios during every interaction, reverting risky transactions
• Multi-asset collateral: Mix of liquid DeFi assets and RWA collateral for diversification

Critical Questions:

• What percentage of wsrUSD backing is RWAs vs. onchain DeFi? (Not disclosed)
• Who are the custodians for T-Bills? (Not disclosed)
• What happens if Reservoir's RWA custodian fails?

References:

• CoinGecko - Wrapped Savings rUSD
• Introducing Reservoir

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3. Fasanara Genesis Fund

Risk Score: 4.5/5

Description: Fasanara Capital is a London-based institutional investment manager with $4B+ AUM that has launched tokenized fund products. The Genesis Alpha Fund is a hedge fund strategy tokenized onchain. InfiniFi appears to be depositing into USDC-denominated Fasanara products.

Key Risk Factors:

Risk Category	Assessment	Details
Off-Chain Exposure	Extreme	Entire fund structure operates in traditional finance with blockchain only for token representation
Custodial Risk	Extreme	Fund assets held by traditional custodians, not onchain; counterparty risk to Fasanara and sub-custodians
Transparency	Very Low	Hedge fund strategies typically opaque; holdings, positions, and risk exposures not disclosed publicly
Regulatory Risk	Very High	Subject to UK/EU fund regulations; regulatory action could freeze redemptions or assets
Liquidity Risk	Very High	Hedge funds typically have redemption gates, lock-up periods, notice requirements; may not be liquid during crisis
Investment Risk	High	Hedge fund investment strategies carry market risk, credit risk, leverage risk depending on mandate
Operational Risk	Medium-High	Depends on Fasanara's operational capabilities, controls, and fund administration
Legal Risk	High	Fund structure, jurisdiction, bankruptcy remoteness unclear

Why This Matters:

• This is NOT DeFi: Fasanara Genesis Fund is a traditional hedge fund with a blockchain token wrapper. The underlying assets and risks are entirely TradFi.
• Extreme opacity: InfiniFi users have no visibility into what Fasanara is actually investing in
• Redemption risk: Hedge funds commonly implement gates, suspensions, or forced lock-ups during market stress
• Counterparty concentration: If Fasanara faces operational issues, fraud, or insolvency, funds could be lost
• InfiniFi's locked position: Cannot exit quickly if Fasanara faces issues

Critical Questions:

• What is the Genesis Alpha Fund's investment strategy? (Not disclosed in public docs)
• What are the redemption terms? Lock-up period? Notice requirements?
• What custodian holds the fund's assets?
• Is the fund domiciled in a bankruptcy-remote structure?
• What is Fasanara's track record with this fund?

Mitigating Factors:

• Fasanara is an established institutional manager with $4B+ AUM and regulatory oversight
• Tokenization via ERC-3643 standard provides some structural compliance

References:

• Ledger Insights - Fasanara Tokenized MMF
• Genesis Alpha Fund Overview
• Fasanara Capital Website

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4. Tokemak autoUSD (now "Auto Finance")

Risk Score: 3.5/5

Description: autoUSD is an autonomous liquidity pool that aggregates stablecoin yield opportunities across multiple DeFi protocols. It automatically allocates capital between lending protocols (Aave, Fluid, Morpho), DEXs (Curve, Balancer), and yield-bearing stablecoins (sUSDe, sUSDS, sFRAX, scrvUSD) to optimize returns. Launched April 9, 2025.

Note on Rebrand: Tokemak rebranded to Auto Finance — same team, same protocol, new name. TOKE tokens convert to AUTO at 1:1. The rebrand is framed as product evolution from "liquidity infrastructure" to "automated onchain finance." Tokemak v1 had a known systemic design risk where its "Reactor" model absorbed impermanent loss for depositors — if losses exceeded reserves, depositors could lose funds. TOKE token price declined from ~$40+ (2021) to under $1, reflecting significant loss of market confidence. No confirmed exploits found, but a privilege escalation vulnerability was disclosed where a liquidity operator could potentially steal funds.

Key Risk Factors:

Risk Category	Assessment	Details
Compounded Smart Contract Risk	Very High	Multi-layer exposure: InfiniFi → autoUSD → (Aave, Compound, DEXs, other protocols). Each layer multiplies risk.
Algorithmic Allocation Risk	High	Tokemak's proprietary algorithms decide where to deploy funds; if logic is flawed, funds could be allocated poorly or to risky venues
Dependency Risk	High	Relies on Tokemak protocol security, governance, and ongoing operation
Transparency	Medium	Allocation decisions made algorithmically; current positions visible onchain but future allocations unpredictable
Liquidity Risk	Medium-High	Ability to redeem depends on underlying protocol liquidity and autoUSD's ability to rebalance
Governance Risk	Medium	Tokemak governance could change allocation strategies or parameters
Offchain Risk	Low	Primarily deploys to onchain DeFi protocols

Why This Matters:

• Complexity compounds risk: Each additional layer (InfiniFi → autoUSD → underlying protocols) introduces new failure modes
• Black box allocation: Users don't directly control where funds go; Tokemak algorithms make decisions
• Multiple attack surfaces: Exploit in autoUSD contract, OR exploit in any underlying protocol, OR flawed allocation logic all create loss potential
• InfiniFi's locked position: Cannot quickly exit if autoUSD faces issues or allocates to risky venues

Mitigating Factors:

• Tokemak is an established DeFi protocol with significant TVL and track record
• Algorithmic allocation can respond faster than manual management to changing yield opportunities
• Diversification across multiple protocols provides some risk distribution
• Onchain transparency allows monitoring of current allocations

Critical Questions:

• What are autoUSD's allocation rules and constraints?
• Can Tokemak governance direct allocations to high-risk protocols?
• What is autoUSD's track record during market stress events?

References:

• Auto Finance Blog - autoUSD Launch
• Auto Finance Rebrand Announcement
• Trust Security - Tokemak Vulnerability Disclosure

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Aggregate Risk Assessment

Combined Impact on InfiniFi:

1. Cascading Failure Potential: A loss event in any high-risk farm could trigger:

   • liUSD first-loss buffer consumption
   • Panic redemptions from siUSD and iUSD holders
   • Depletion of liquid reserves ($37.78M)
   • Queue activation → potential de-peg fears → bank run dynamics

2. Illiquidity Trap: All high-risk farms are "locked until maturity":

   • InfiniFi cannot quickly exit positions even if risk escalates
   • During crisis, protocol forced to rely on $37.78M liquid buffer (21% of TVL)
   • 79% in illiquid strategies means limited ability to meet mass redemptions

3. Off-Chain Dependency: Despite marketing as DeFi protocol:

   • Reservoir: RWA/T-Bill exposure
   • Fasanara: Complete TradFi hedge fund
   • Combined, these introduce traditional finance failure modes (custodian insolvency, regulatory freeze, valuation manipulation, redemption gates)

4. Disclosure Gap: Initial protocol documentation emphasizes "Aave, Fluid, Pendle, Ethena" but:

   • Omits mention of Gauntlet Frontier (highest-risk tier)
   • Omits mention of RWA exposure via Reservoir
   • Omits mention of TradFi exposure via Fasanara
   • Omits mention of compounding complexity via autoUSD

Recommendation:

Users and protocols integrating with InfiniFi should:

• Treat InfiniFi as having significant offchain/RWA exposure (not pure DeFi)
• Understand that 79% of TVL is locked in illiquid strategies including high-risk farms
• Monitor the $37.78M liquid reserve closely — this is the only buffer against redemption requests
• Watch for governance proposals that increase allocation to high-risk farms
• Implement enhanced monitoring of the farms listed above, especially:
  • Gauntlet Frontier vault health and Morpho market conditions
  • Reservoir's RWA composition and redemption queue status
  • Fasanara Genesis Fund NAV and redemption terms
  • Tokemak autoUSD allocation decisions

Data Sources:

• InfiniFi Transparency Dashboard - farm allocations
• Farm-specific documentation linked in each section above